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This collection of Derrida’s essays is entitled Acts of Religion, not “thoughts,”
“essays,” or “writings” on religion. It is an appropriate title. These works, selected
from Derrida’s oeuvre from 1980 to 2001 by Gil Anidjar of Columbia University,
constitute an endeavor to clarify and re-think the terms and critical techniques used
in philosophical discussions of religion. As Anidjar puts it in his introduction, they
“do not merely constitute an exploration of familiar theologemes,” but rather con-
sist “of a manifold and powerful effort to situate and raise again questions of
tradition, faith, and sacredness and their relation to the premises of philosophy and
political culture” (3). This effort is a combination of three separate but interrelated
“acts”: an act of remembering, an act of looking forward, and an active defense of
the ongoing project of linguistic critique itself.
In “Faith and Knowledge,” (1996) Derrida examines the philosophical history of
the distinction between religion and reason, and formulates a theory of common
origin, a “fiduciary ‘link’ [that] would precede all determinate community, all
positive religion, every onto-anthropo-theological horizon” (55, his italics). This
link (the root word, religio) is an act of faith, required to transcend the “one,” to
reach the absolute other.  Understood thus, religion and what he terms “tele-
technoscience” stem from the same source; even as they position themselves as
opposed, they rely upon one another, and spread together (positioned as oppo-
sites), a process that Derrida terms “globalatinization.”
This theory of common origin is also a memory of a “sacred language,” an
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assessment of notions of originality and translation formulated in “Des Tours de
Babel” (1980) and “The Eyes of Language” (late 1980s, published here for the first
time). In “Des Tours de Babel,” Derrida rereads the story of Babel as an archetypal
example of a sacred text, a text that demands translation, but which, once translated,
loses its distinctive quality, its status as naming, rather than communication. Stated
broadly, “Translation is neither an image nor a copy” (115) of an original text, but
rather an outgrowth. In fact, every text implies its own translation—its own trans-
latability.
At the same time, as Derrida highlights in “The Eyes of Language,” the act of
translation is a “remembering” in its own right, a harkening back to a performative
language, the sacred (heilige, unscathed) language of pure naming. In this analysis
of Gershom Scholen’s 1926 letter to Franz Rozensweig, Derrida explores the con-
cept of the “secularization”—the instrumentalization—of the sacred language (He-
brew). He concludes that, like translation, this secularization is impossible; it is in
fact merely a manner of speaking (façon de parler), but that this manner of speaking
comprises the very secularization of which it speaks. Both translation and secular-
ization, as acts, point out the impossibility and necessity of a metalanguage, a
language for talking about language—a deconstruction.
The violence implicit in the instrumentalization of the sacred language also finds
expression, in “Interpretations at War” (1989) and “Force of Law,” (1990) as the
foundation of the State. These two pivotal essays trace the act of forgetting that
erases foundational violence and enables a State to posit itself as just. The found-
ing of law “would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore
interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust” (241). Derrida also
undertakes a deconstruction of the opposition between this violence and perpetu-
ating violence (Benjamin’s gewalt, legitimized violence), demonstrating that the
two cannot be convincingly distinguished. Just as the sacred language returns in
explosive outbreaks of unintelligibility (Babel), so does the forgotten violence re-
surface in new “general strikes” against State authority.
In undertaking these acts of memory, Derrida is also figuring a forward-looking
act. As he explains in the two essays on justice and law, each remembered performative
event also posits its own “future anterior” (avenir). State violence (the law, gewalt)
posits its own existence in a future-perfect tense in order to define (retrospectively)
its own foundational, unjustifiable violence as just. It is this game of future pres-
ence and absence that forms the basis for his later work in “Hostipitality,” a series
of lectures from 1997, published here for the first time in Anidjar’s translation.
Bound up in the “religio,” in the link to memory, is a messianic or apocalyptic
promise, a redoubled fiduciary link that runs forward as well as backward. These
two acts, the (remembered) belief and the messianic avenir constitute for Derrida
the foundation of religion, and also of rational linguistic discourse.
By the end of the 1980s Derrida was well aware of the criticisms leveled at his
practice of deconstruction, and in particular the objection that it renders justice
impossible. His third and final “act” is to refute this claim, in “Interpretations at
War” and “Force of Law,” the pivotal essays that mark his turn toward religion via
an analysis of justice. Through a careful historical treatment of that most unjust,
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unspeakable act, the Nazi “final solution,” he proposes that it is precisely the
neglect of deconstructive critique, the surrender to gewalt (the law that is violence)
that leads to such atrocities. For Derrida, it is vital to see “justice as the possibility
of deconstruction, the structure of right or of the law” (243).
Derrida’s three “acts of religion” have profound implications for the field of
cultural studies. First, he suggests a cautionary reconsideration of the language
commonly used to speak about religion in any cultural context. He presents para-
doxes that question the separability (let alone opposition) of reason and religion, of
religion and tele-technoscience, and of knowledge and belief. His essays are a
potent reminder that it is simultaneously impossible and necessary to stand out-
side of language (or, therefore, culture). Secondly, Derrida also reminds us of the all-
pervasiveness of religion in human language and experience. Its presence takes the
form of the (forgotten, “absent”) fiduciary link, the leap of faith from the one to the
absolute other (i.e., belief), but also of the avenir, the “future anterior” that posits
its own future to establish the present, allowing for the growth of both religion and
tele-technoscience. To disregard the role of religion, of the originary moment of
faith, of performative (naming) language, of justice, is to disregard the very founda-
tion that makes the metalanguage—the study of anything—both necessary and
impossible.
